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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has poured a great deal of investment into the various dimensions of intra-state peacekeeping. The United Nations (UN) has played roles in post-conflict states ranging from brokering and enforcing peace agreements to, most expansively, comprehensive peace-building interventions applied over a transitional governance period. In the latter approach, the UN works with domestic elites to reconstruct state capacity and to build a democratic system, governing in collaboration with domestic elites until a first election is held. The aim is transformativeto lastingly alter the domestic political game by constructing the institutions of effective and legitimate democratic governance that are the foundation of a sustainable peace.
I argue in this paper that the transitional governance approach has unintended consequences that undermine the peace it is trying to build in post-conflict countries. The model has been quite successful in implanting the formal administrative and constitutional institutions associated with effective and legitimate governance, which must be acknowledged as important steps towards state-and democracy-building. But it is essential to consider the longer-term governance outcomes that result in order to truly assess whether stable and lasting peace is built, and here the results are rather less promising. Through comparative process-tracing of transitional governance outcomes in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, I illustrate that the UN's peace-building strategy has been ill-suited to the challenge of dealing with the predatory political economy of insecurity that often emerges in post-conflict societies.
1
In peace-building attempts in the three countries considered, the domestic elites empowered by the international community during the transitional governance period subsequently consolidated their holds on power in a zero-sum political-economic calculus relying on predation and patronage. In essence, the peace-building process becomes coopted by domestic elites who use the legitimacy and power resources granted by transitional governance, and the subsequent aid economy, to turn the state into an arena of rent-seeking and distribution that is then employed in the struggle for political power. The political economy calculus facing domestic elites orients them towards a patronage generation and distribution system that undermines legitimate and effective governance and underpins a cycle of persistent insecurity.
I situate my argument within the broader peace-building literature in the first section of the paper, emphasising the need to import a political economy perspective. Second, I
274 Naazneen H. Barma outline the research design employed, defining transitional governance and the outcomes of interest. In the third section, I briefly trace the process of transitional governance in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan to illustrate that this form of peace-building is coopted into a domestic political economy of patronage. The fourth section elaborates on the logic of this predatory dynamic and how it underpins persistent insecurity. A concluding section sketches some theoretical and policy implications.
The peace-building scholarship: from process to politics
The study of the processes and implications of peace-building has proliferated as the practices of peace-building have evolved over the past 20 years. This growing body of work has yielded valuable contributions in terms of studying the multiple dimensions of conflict management through negotiated settlements and peace processes, defining and conceptualising peacekeeping and peace-building, cataloguing the implementation of international peace operations, identifying some of the contextual factors necessary for success in peace operation implementation and generating lessons learned for policy application. 2 Yet, given the proliferation of work on peacekeeping and peace-building, there remain surprising lacunae in this field of study. In particular, scholars have tended to treat peacebuilding as a process, emphasising the institutional contours of a peace settlement at the time of its implementation to the neglect of truly assessing whether a stable and lasting peace results in the longer term. Building on various sub-disciplinary perspectives, as I sketch below, the peace-building scholarship has evolved from the initial set of largely descriptive and policy-prescriptive assessments of peace-building interventions to develop a deeper emphasis on the interaction of international and local actors and a more nuanced approach to the politics of peace-building. Nevertheless, the literature tends to inadequately capture the agency of domestic elites on long-term governance outcomes because it under-emphasises the manner in which domestic political economy incentives shape consequences.
The peacekeeping literature in international relations-on both inter-state and civil wars-focuses for the most part on the factors that contribute to peace maintenance, or the prevention of a return to conflict, and its duration. 3 Although this is certainly an important outcome to study, this lens restricts our understanding of causal mechanisms as well as outcomes, since it focuses on the peace settlement and the choice of formal Peace-building and the predatory political economy of insecurity 275 institutions but does not examine the subsequent domestic political outcomes that result in the consolidation phase. Turning to comparative politics for insight on the domestic dynamics of peace-building, it becomes clear that scholars have much to say about the effects of elections and constitutional design on post-conflict peace as well as the connection between peace-building and democratisation. 4 While this focus on institutional form is certainly warranted, it is essential to also explicitly consider the interaction of institutions with the political environment in which they exist and the agency of domestic elites who both control and are constrained by them.
Single country case studies of peace operations abound. These are rich in description but they are rarely self-consciously theoretical and again underplay causal mechanisms and the interaction of international peace-building strategies with the domestic political environments in which they unfold. Another line of analytical inquiry focuses on the machinery and processes of transitional governance itself-comparing the various mechanisms through which the international community has attempted to aid weak, failed and post-conflict states. 5 These are often more operationally oriented evaluations of state-building that focus on the case-specific, technocratic details of intervention, and are largely descriptive and pre-theoretical. Many of these scholars acknowledge the importance of political context, but their analyses tend to attribute success or failure of UN-led peace-building exercises to the scope and implementation of the UN mandates themselves.
The newest strand of the literature on peace-building has moved some way towards taking a more theoretical approach towards the practice, the stance also adopted in this paper. A number of scholars have developed critiques of the 'liberal peace-building' model as practiced by the UN and the international community. Some have delved with a critical lens into the meta-theoretical concerns that are inherent in the issue, questioning the international community's motivation in applying the conventional peace-building model and the appropriateness of the model's content-Weberian bureaucracy, liberal democracy and neoliberal economics-in the post-conflict countries in which it is attempted. Others have focused the critique on the model's implementation in the form of 'neo-trusteeship' and the mechanics of international involvement and donor-driven assistance. 6 What tends to remain lacking is a focus on the domestic political dynamics that interact with the content and mechanisms of the peace-building approach itself. 7 The approach of peacebuilding through transitional governance is not undertaken in a political vacuum even when formal institutional structures have collapsed. On the contrary, peace-building is a 276 Naazneen H. Barma hyper-political undertaking; and the political-economic incentives facing domestic elites in the course of peace-building should be emphasised much as elite pacts and settlements are highlighted in the democratisation literature.
In sum, in studying peace-building and defining its outcomes, analysts have tended to focus on the processes and institutional forms comprising the practice of peace-building.
Some scholars have introduced the more agent-centred focus necessary to examine how international and domestic actors bargain and interact. Yet the literature still tends to suffer from a short-term focus, with an overemphasis on the institutional forms associated with peace-building instead of deeper examination of the consolidated governance outcomes that result. In order to truly understand whether peace-building approaches can and do achieve their objectives of building sustainable and lasting peace, it is necessary to fill this gap. One essential step towards doing so is to examine the political economy of peace-building, the focus of this study.
What does it mean to bring a political economy perspective to the study of peacebuilding? The study of intra-state conflict processes was revolutionised by an attention to the economic incentives that faced warring parties and, subsequently, by the consensus that economic and socio-political factors serve not as alternative explanations for conflict but, rather, as complementary dynamics-greed and grievance-that interact in triggering and sustaining conflict. 8 The study of how societies end and recover from conflict requires a similar emphasis on the political-economic motivations orienting the parties to peace, in the context of the institutional forms that constrain them. To investigate the political economy of peace-building is to pay careful empirical attention to the economic incentives that shape and constrain elites' political goals and strategies; and the political incentives affecting their intention and ability to pursue broad-based economic development and thereby deliver the benefits of peace across society.
I adopt such a political economy approach here, especially emphasising the ability of elites to make credible commitments to each other and to the populace, and focusing on the economic goods that elites must deliver to citizens in order to retain their political support. 9 In turn, this commands attention to how political and administrative institutions shape time horizons and elite incentives; and to how the elites who control the state deliver the benefits that underpin their compact with society. The liberal ideal embedded in the UN's peace-building model is that democratically elected elites will aggregate collective social preferences and will use the state apparatus to deliver programmatic policies and public goods and, thus, the shared prosperity that is a pillar of Peace-building and the predatory political economy of insecurity 277 sustainable peace. The post-conflict reality, however-as illustrated in the empirical section below-is that the political-economic incentives facing elites are such that it is easier and more profitable for them to distribute public rents and patronage goods to their clients in exchange for political support. Put simply, when time horizons are short and citizens cannot hold elites accountable for their commitments to provide public goods, elite incentives privilege narrow benefit provision to specific clients instead of public goods that benefit all citizens. In doing so, furthermore, elites under these conditions can channel their appeal to citizens through hierarchical patron-client networks, thus obviating their own need to build credibility with the populace-through, for example, institutionalised political parties-and undermining the formal structures of authority. 10 This equilibrium, I will demonstrate, not only privileges elites and their networks over society at large, it also has adverse consequences for peace because it underpins a new form of persistent insecurity.
A suboptimal political economy equilibrium of this nature may be relatively common to new democracies suffering from weak credibility. Yet transformational peace-building purports to build legitimate and effective governance-and this paper demonstrates that it fails to do so because of the political economy dynamics put into play. The peace-building approach itself weakens credibility to begin with by picking winners among elites, and the resources it confers upon these elites are co-opted in a domestic political economy of patronage through which predatory conflict and insecurity persist. To illustrate how this occurs, I employ a process-tracing approach to understanding transitional governance and its outcomes in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan.
Research design
Transitional governance is an attempt to forge sustainable peace in nations riven by civil war by building state capacity and democracy in order to productively channel inter-group conflict. The UN has never laid out an explicit model of transitional governance; hence, I
build an inductive definition, based on the mandates of the peace operations that attempt this manner of transformative peace-building. 11 A UN transitional authority or assistance mission is mandated by the UN Security Council to assist with the implementation of a negotiated peace settlement over a specified transitional period, typically two to three years. The hallmark of transitional governance, distinguishing it from all other, less transformational, versions of multidimensional peacekeeping is that the appointed 278 Naazneen H. Barma mission is responsible to some degree for performing the executive functions of the state.
During the course of the transitional period the UN relies on a small group of domestic counterparts to assist with governing over the transitional period and to provide some form of domestic political participation in the process. Finally, the transitional period culminates in a UN-organised national election for a constituent assembly, which then agrees on a constitution and other core choices about institutional architecture and is transformed into the national legislature of a newly (re)constituted country. While the UN and international aid organisations remain involved in various forms of assistance, a legitimate domestic government takes hold of the reins of administrative power. The UN has pursued peace-building that conforms to this implicit transitional governance strategy in only five post-conflict countries since the end of the Cold War-Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia (Eastern Slavonia), East Timor and Kosovo.
12
The transitional governance approach assumes that the international community can help to build the institutional foundations for stable, effective and legitimate government. 13 International norms play a major role in shaping the formal institutional outcomes sought by peace-building through transitional governance-the rationalised bureaucracy that makes up the administrative apparatus of the state; and the liberal democracy that has come, since the end of the Cold War, to represent the sole externally legitimate form of domestic politics. International interventions in state-and democracybuilding are focused, in practice, on the construction of these formal institutional structures of the administrative and political arenas. These institutional forms are, nevertheless, laid down in local political contexts that necessarily affect governance outcomes. The degree to which sustainable peace is truly built can be assessed only by looking at the consolidated outcomes in terms of state capacity and democratisation.
Relying on the widely-used definition developed by Linz and Stepan, I consider democracy consolidated when it has become-behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally 'the only game in town'. 14 Similarly, we know a strong state and its hallmarks when we see them in action-from Weber onwards, the definition of the state has been primarily institutional and centred around autonomous, rationalised bureaucracy. The building of state capacity also requires development of the state's reach in authority vis-à-vis society. 15 How should we expect the transitional governance strategy to play out in dynamic domestic political environments? In attempting this type of transformative peacebuilding, the UN is trying to do something that has never been achieved: simultaneous state-and democracy-building. If transitional governance worked, the rebuilt state would
Peace-building and the predatory political economy of insecurity 279 serve as an arena of authority and legitimacy to protect against the corruption of the political process and nascent democracy. But, in practice, transitional governance experiences have been co-opted, with the state becoming captured by domestic elites intent on winning the political game. State capacity-building ceases since the rulers of the state use it for patronage distribution; and democracy-building is thwarted by the use of patronage resources to cement a hegemonic hold on power. The overall result is persistent insecurity.
In order to demonstrate this pattern, I trace the process of how transitional governance in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan-the three developing countries with weak institutional capacity in which the approach has been implemented-led to a series of unintended political-economic consequences that centre around the generation and distribution of patronage resources. Peace-building disappointments in post-conflict states are characterised by equifinality; the odds are stacked against success and numerous causal pathways can be identified in leading to failure. But process-tracing can be used to identify a plausible causal chain-hence I employ a structured, focused comparison of the three cases with an emphasis on developing within-case analysis using process-tracing to strengthen causal inference. 16 This idiographic approach rests on the rich case study 
Tracing the political economy of peace-building
In Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, domestic political elites interacted with the UN over the transitional governance period to establish institutional arrangements aspiring to effective and legitimate governance and tailored, to some extent, to local political reality. Yet, in all three countries, longer-term governance outcomes have failed to truly transform the political context to ensure peace. The contemporary Cambodian political-economic equilibrium is one where the hegemonic ruling party quashes dissent and controls all the levers of administrative and political power in a situation of grand state capture. In East Timor, a nascent peace was upended by continuing elite factional battles Political elites have expanded their patronage networks vertically to accumulate uncontested power at the subnational level and horizontally to include wealthy business interests and military leaders, who control, together with politicians in mutually beneficial arrangements, access to most of the country's lucrative natural resources, including timber and now oil. 26 Preferred access to government procurement contracts is another channel for rent distribution. As these predatory patterns have increasingly permeated the country's political economy, the role of violence and intimidation in influencing election results has given way to an increasing reliance on patronage distribution aimed towards uncontested political dominance. 27 In this way, elite predation has replaced outright conflict as the main avenue through which Cambodians experience insecurity and vulnerability in everyday life.
The process of peace-building through transitional governance was co-opted into this predatory political economy of insecurity. Building a sustainable and inclusive postconflict peace in Cambodia required the severing of the CPP's administrative stranglehold.
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But the transitional governance strategy and the rush to elections led to precisely the opposite result by first empowering the CPP as the UN's de facto preferred working counterpart since the UN saw the CPP as the only practical domestic interlocutor. UNTAC then subsequently gave the CPP the stamp of legitimacy it fell short of achieving when it failed to win the first election by standing by as it subverted those election results. As a result, Cambodia continues to be governed by elites 'whose monopoly on power has remained mostly untouched since 1979'. 28 UNTAC was simply unable to alter the domestic political-economic landscape, as CPP elites successfully used the legitimacy bestowed upon them by the international community to strengthen their grip on the institutions and human resources of the state apparatus, and thereby to cement their holds on power and enrich themselves over time. The lack of accountability has both undermined democracy and 'entrenched the threat of violence as an ever-present prop to the system'.
29
The international community lost the opportunity to build a countervailing locus of authority in Cambodia that could potentially prevail against a predatory political elite, extend time horizons and reorient elite incentives towards public goods provision rather than patronage, and thereby form the basis for lasting peace and security.
East Timor
The East Timorese people voted for their nation's independence in 1999, following an almost 25-year guerrilla resistance movement against Indonesian occupation. Responding to the scorched earth violence and forcible deportations carried out by retreating proIndonesia militia groups, the United Nations mounted its most ambitious ever peacebuilding exercise, the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). Under this coalition government, the elite-driven, hierarchical and patron-client nature of politics in East Timor has continued to assert itself. Overlaid on the political culture is the fact that East Timor is one of the most petroleum-dependent countries in the world, with oil and natural gas revenues providing more than 98 per cent of government revenues. Political elites have benefitted from the recent commodity price boom, reaping the benefits of the patronage distribution made possible by the petroleum revenue stream.
In this respect, East Timor appears to be following a pattern familiar to rentier states, with public sector hiring and pay increasing along with growing concerns over elite capture of petroleum concessions and lucrative procurement contracts. 33 Furthermore, in terms of political patronage, preliminary analysis of the geographic allocation of public spending in East Timor indicates that the government is spending more-in terms of both cash transfers to the population and public investment allocation to clients-in the districts most strongly supportive of the coalition partners in the 2007 election. 34 Viewing these various public spending measures in the best possible light, the government is acting to 'buy the peace', distributing rents to key constituencies in order to pacify dissent, dampen conflict and maintain stability. A more ominous telling is that Timorese elites are consolidating a predatory grip on power through the capture and strategic distribution of major patronage streams. Growing public resentment and intra-elite competition combine with still weakly institutionalised administrative and political arenas to produce an atmosphere of persistent insecurity. Ten years later, the deep elite power struggles at the heart of Afghanistan's political instability persist. Early successes in constitution-making and elections gave way to a deteriorating security environment and setbacks in terms of effective and legitimate governance. Afghanistan's foremost challenge to democratic consolidation comes from subnational strongmen at the head of complex patronage networks endowed with alternative sources of power, legitimacy and economic rents from those of the central government. The Karzai regime has increasingly built its own clientelist base in the provinces by distributing government positions to allies; in return, this network delivers electoral returns, with tribal leaders warned that if they fail to support the regime they will be excluded from local government and its attendant patronage spoils in the form of jobs, aid and other privileges. 36 The international community's strategy of prioritising the stabilisation of the country through a combination of democratisation and political dealmaking has acted against the peace-building imperative precisely by reinforcing traditional fragmentary loci of power, many of which have now come to operate in zero-sum opposition to the central state rather than in co-operation with it.
Afghanistan
The need to deal with powerful political elites-by either neutralising or incorporating them-continues to be the major obstacle besetting both state-building and democratic consolidation in Afghanistan. Appointed by the centre, many provincial governors and district officers received their posts because of their independent and traditional power bases. Among the 249 legislators elected to the first national assembly, for example, were 40 commanders still linked to militias; and nearly half of all MPs were mujahedeen veterans of the war against the Soviets in the 1980s. 37 The patronage culture associated with the militias has yet to be replaced by government and civil society institutions that offer public services in an accountable manner. A frequent complaint of Afghans living in Kandahar, for example, is that life has reverted to the chaos under warring mujahedeen factions. The Afghan state remains splintered, both politically and administratively-in turn making the quest for sustainable peace in the country elusive.
The predatory political economy of insecurity
In Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, the UN attempted to alter the domestic political game by facilitating a process of administrative and political institutional engineering by domestic elites. Few would deny that some success in democracy-building has been achieved in each case, setbacks notwithstanding. On the state-building front, Peace-building and the predatory political economy of insecurity 287 moreover, even though government effectiveness and institutional quality remain low, each country has developed some degree of state infrastructure and a public service delivery footprint. In these respects, the conclusions of this paper are in no way intended to imply that any of the three countries considered here are worse off than they otherwise would have been as a result of peace-building through transitional governance. Indeed, they are all fundamentally more stable than before the interventions and maintain a basic degree of the government effectiveness and accountability that are the hallmarks of the modern state.
Nevertheless, the evidence from Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan indicates that the implicit theory behind the strategy of peace-building through transitional governance is fundamentally flawed in both concept and practice and leads to predictable disappointments in long-term governance outcomes. The evidence from the cases demonstrates that no matter how well administrative and political institutions are tailored in design, during the course of transitional governance, in practice, powerful domestic groups co-opt and dominate the institutional choice process and subsequently consolidate their holds on power, damaging the prospects for democratic governance. The liberal peace-building model brings with it significant resources and, in turn, the allocation and control of those resources become a new site of power for elites. 42 Through the transitional governance process-and its unique need for a counterpart to help govern-the UN enables certain domestic elites to entrench themselves in power and, in turn, bestows legitimacy upon them through democratic elections along with the other power and patronage resources that come with control of the state.
As transitional governance becomes co-opted by domestic elites intent on remaining in power, a predatory political economy dynamic sets in. The patterns of predation are familiar to observers of developing countries-especially those where there are large and exclusive benefits to holding power. 43 In an environment where institutions are weak and the shadow of the future is of uncertain length, time horizons are short and politics becomes a zero-sum game. Elites benefitting from predation while in power, and fearing the consequences of losing office, use the resources of the state as political patronage and hijack the process of consolidation of autonomous state structures. The state comes to mirror the political balance, instead of becoming the necessary countervailing arena of authority and legitimacy. In a perverse way, the pursuit of electoral democracy makes this problem worse, because it increases the size of the 'selectorate' , or the fraction of society that is allowed to choose the political leadership, without meaningfully affecting the size of 288 Naazneen H. Barma the 'winning coalition', or the fraction of the selectorate that enables the leadership to stay in power. 44 The resulting elite incentives mean that predatory rent-seeking and narrow patronage distribution to key supporters will be relatively high and broad-based public goods provision correspondingly low.
The cases illustrate in subtly different ways how this core dynamic of predatory state capture is perversely enabled through the transitional governance model's simultaneous pursuit of state-and democracy-building. In Cambodia, the UN emphasised a quick route to elections to excise the hostile Khmer Rouge from the legitimate body politic; but this and a predatory dynamic that continues to undermine governance appears to be intensifying as a result of East Timor's natural resource rent streams.
In Afghanistan, the tension between state-and democracy-building formed the core of the international community's dilemma in developing a peace-building strategy. It was framed as the struggle between the imperative to stabilise the country and the goal of giving the long-war-torn country a new lease on democratic nationhood. The UN and the United States assumed that for the state to function at all, the loci of power held by the Peace-building and the predatory political economy of insecurity 289 mujahedeen leaders would have to be incorporated into the new government, and Karzai invited these warlords to serve in his cabinet and as his provincial governors. Once bestowed with this legitimacy, these well-resourced veterans of Afghan political society were adept in consolidating their own patron-client networks; and elites around Karzai have done the same. The result is a weak and fragmentary state that struggles to resource its minimal activity and defend the country against the predatory rent-seeking and violence perpetuated by entrenched political elites at both the central and subnational levels.
Patterns of predation differ across the three countries, to be sure-with two major elements of variation being the degree to which elites co-operate in predation and, relatedly, the level of politically motivated conflict that persists as a result. Cambodian elites across the political spectrum appear to be enmeshed in a system of co-operative predation where patronage has replaced outright violence in seeking electoral support. In
East Timor, with the group in power controlling the levers of patronage distribution, intraelite schisms persist and underlay a volatile insecurity. In Afghanistan, patterns of predation manifest themselves in a more conflictual manner, with multiple patron-client networks engaged in persistent conflict. One way of understanding this variation in future research might lie in the degree to which patron-client bonds align with political parties.
Where subnational patrons are traditionally strong, such as in Afghanistan, national elites will find it easier to rely upon local leaders even when this strategy creates personal fiefdoms. In contrast, if competition among patrons is high and instrumental ties more common, for example in Cambodia, parties can create their own new linkages, but at the expense of higher patronage distribution.
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These differences notwithstanding, the stakes of control over the state are extremely high in each case. Patron-client relationships are not coercive, but rather instrumental and centred on reciprocal exchange-the patron uses his influence and resources to provide benefits or protection to the client, who reciprocates with political support and personal services. 46 Electoral systems spur competition among elites for the necessary voter followings and increase the size of the patronage distribution necessary for client support.
The absence of strong institutions, in turn, only exacerbates the reliance on patron-client networks as the source of political power. Finally, the survival or demise of political elites, in a newly institutionalising system, depends on the success of their network at tapping patronage resources for distribution. Thus, once entrenched, and fearing the consequences of losing power, elites face very short time horizons that lead to a vicious circle-elites with high discount rates increase predation in the present time period; they also have less 290 Naazneen H. Barma incentive to invest in institutional capacity, thus failing to lengthen time horizons and intensifying the current stakes. A predatory political economy is a self-reinforcing equilibrium: when the stakes include survival, political elites are willing to retain power by any means, including predation, even as they erode social cohesion. 47 Elites that try to maintain stability through coercion and patronage risk future episodes of conflict-and a cycle of insecurity persists.
Conclusions and implications
International attempts at peace-building in post-conflict countries have been predicated on the belief that the assistance of third parties can address the root causes of conflict by transforming the socio-political dynamics and context that led to violence in the first place. I have argued in this paper that the United Nations, in its strategy of peace-building through transitional governance, acts on an implicit theory about how best to change the domestic political game in order to create the foundations for sustainable peace. Yet this approach to peace-building falls short of achieving effective and legitimate governance because the domestic elites empowered by the international community consolidate their own holds on power in a zero-sum political-economic calculus that enables and relies on predation and patronage.
Most perversely, the democracy-building and state-strengthening dimensions of the strategy of peace-building through transitional governance act at cross-purposes to each other in the attempt to reorient the domestic political game away from conflict. At the very core of the tension is a simple conundrum: the international community needs counterparts for state-building but it must attempt to be neutral in democracy-building.
The transitional governance model essentially takes a short cut on the state-building side by relying on specific elites as local counterparts and agents of change, instead of putting in the time and investment for meaningful processes of political participation and institutionalisation such as party-building. Choosing a counterpart in this manner means that the UN essentially bestows legitimacy upon an entrenched elite and endows it with some measure of control over the state apparatus-as observed in the cases above. The failures of these transitional governance experiments to consolidate some measure of autonomous capacity in the state makes it ripe for patronage pickings-and powerful elites use their control over state resources to manoeuvre within the new politicaleconomic landscape and ensure their on-going hegemony.
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It is possible to argue that the political economy of patronage is simply to be expected in post-conflict states, that collusive rent-seeking among elites and the distribution of benefits through patron-client networks is simply the price of peace and is preferable to outright conflict. 48 In this line of thinking, moreover, the political economy of predation may actually represent a secular improvement in the post-conflict country's journey from war to sustainable peace, with patronage systems representing a form of routinisation of political economy in a thinly institutionalised environment. Yet the goal of the international community in peacebuilding is to institute effective and legitimate government as the basis for sustainable peace, not stand by as patronage and predation contribute to persistent insecurity.
International interventions can only help in crafting lasting peace by understanding the political economy of conflict persistence and the potential levers for altering, rather than enabling and perpetuating, those dynamics. Four interrelated policy implications emerge.
First is the need to avoid picking winners during the transitional period and thereby locking in a particular domestic power configuration. The goal here would be to enforce uncertainty rather than inevitability about who will take the reins of power at transition. If elites are uncertain about their prospects, they will be more willing to agree on institutional arrangements that make elite alternation more likely. 49 The one-shot game of constitution-writing introduced by the transitional governance process is problematic because elites with short-time horizons will write rules that entrench themselves in power.
The possibility of revising the rules of the game at several defined future intervals could, by contrast, encourage moderation in institutional design.
Second, to similarly prevent state capture by anointed elites, a gradual and more expansive course of peace-building that defers elections and focuses on institutionalisation seems inescapable. 50 Yet postponing elections does not mean that participation has to be attenuated. Non-electoral forms of national-and local-level input can be brought into policy-making and accountability mechanisms-through, for example, traditional consensus institutions such as the Afghan Loya Jirga, or grand council meeting, or the Timorese Nahe Biti Bo'ot system of conflict resolution handled by village elders.
Third, on the political institutionalisation front, party-building is essential because, in terms of the political economy perspective advocated here, it cuts into the vicious circle of weak credibility. Parties serve, in other words, as institutionalised mechanisms to enhance the credibility of the political elite and thus reorient their incentives towards providing broad-based programmatic policies and public goods rather than distributing narrow patronage spoils. 51 292 Naazneen H. Barma
Lastly, the international community would do well to emphasise alternative mechanisms for building the state-society compact, particularly from the ground up.
Potential models include decentralised development programmes like Cambodia's Seila community programme, aimed at increasing local-level participation, and Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme, a similar community-level block grant initiative. The risk with such programmes may be that they fail to build state institutions; but at least they enhance participation and ensure some element of programmatic, noninstrumental service delivery. A complementary tactic could be the contracting out of service delivery to the agents that can best perform the function-be they enclaves within government, donors, non-governmental organisations or private companies.
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The goal is for international donors to focus their partnerships with post-conflict governments on providing public services-thereby undercutting the value to elites of providing particularistic benefits.
The transitional governance model of peace-building, with its static emphasis on institutional form as outcome, has been co-opted in implementation by post-conflict elites. A more subtle approach attuned to institutional function would instead focus on building credibility and accountability, such that elites and their supporters have the incentives to compromise on a programmatic basis over time. The predatory political economy of insecurity is a state between persistent conflict and sustainable peace, a mutual enterprise that benefits competing elites in an equilibrium suboptimal for the rest of society. Only if all domestic stakeholders can benefit from the alternative will a negotiated resolution be possible. Crucially, along the lines offered above, actors must be given the incentives to build institutions and state capacity to lengthen the shadow of the future and alleviate the commitment problems that lead to predation. 53 Just as recent scholarship has emphasised that the factors shaping the onset of war must be separated from the dynamics of conflict, 54 so must the dynamics of post-conflict political economy be understood as yet another logic. Only if we understand the political economy of persistent conflict and insecurity will the international community be able to shape interventions that can alter those dynamics and thereby craft lasting peace. 
